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I. INTRODUCTION 
Personal computers, according to Bill Gates, “have become the 
most empowering tool we’ve ever created. They’re tools of 
communication . . . of creativity . . . and they can be shaped by their 
user.”1 In particular, the changing breadth of intellectual property law 
reflects the popularity of the Internet and its influence on the American 
legal landscape. Current statistics indicate that over 69% of the 
population of the United States uses the Internet.2 This represents an 
explosion of online computer activity in society. Innovation invites the 
potential for abuse, however, and pornography occupies a significant 
sector of the Internet marketplace.3 While it is almost impossible to 
inventory the wealth of available online data, the prevalence of online 
pornography reportedly accounts for 12% of all Internet websites, 25% 
of total search engine requests, and 35% of all monthly peer-to-peer 
downloads.4 Within these, approximately 100,000 websites offer illegal 
child pornography.5 
Courts are quick to convict traffickers who market in online 
pornographic material involving children, but disagree as to the 
appropriate degree of punishment when an offender is released on 
probation subject to special conditions imposed at sentencing.6 
Specifically, the courts of appeals are divided over sentencing sex 
offenders convicted of offenses relating to child pornography.7 Some 
courts impose limitations on computer use or Internet access restricted as 
                                                                                                             
 1 William Henry Gates III, General Partner, Microsoft Corp., Address at the 
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (Feb. 24, 2004). 
 2 Nielsen/NetRatings dated December 31, 2007 indicate the U.S. Census Bureau 
estimates the population of the United States at almost 302 million people, and more than 
215 million people reportedly use the Internet. Internet World Stats, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats14.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2007). 
 3 See Jerry Ropelato, Internet Pornography Statistics, TopTenReviews.com, 
http://internet-filter review.toptenreviews.com/internet-pornography-statistics.html. 
 4 Id. The term “peer-to-peer” refers to a network of people who are logged onto a 
computer system to share and deliver specified files between them, unlike a client/server 
configuration where users download resources from one main computer server. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Compare United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. 
Ct. 1571 (2002) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the Internet was an 
indispensable tool in modern society, to impose a blanket prohibition against Internet 
access), with United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (remanding to revise 
the probationary condition as overly broad because it denied the defendant from using a 
computer for research purposes). 
 7 See, e.g., supra note 6. 
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a condition of probation while others forbid defendants from any form of 
online access.8 Cases throughout the circuits have held both for and 
against the restriction, permitting Internet access in some cases only after 
probationers seek permission from probation officers.9 Those circuits that 
choose to impose a ban on Internet access enforce the condition by 
employing a variety of methods to monitor defendants, including 
unannounced inspections of an offender’s hard drive, installation of 
monitoring and filtering technology on the offender’s computer, and 
initiated invitations of pornographic Internet material to offenders.10   
The Supreme Court justified the use of reasonable conditions that 
deprive probationers of some freedoms by acknowledging that 
probationer status removes the “absolute liberty to which every citizen is 
entitled.”11 While this existing jurisprudence indicates a willingness to 
limit the First and Eighth Amendment rights of parolees,12 the Supreme 
Court has not resolved Fourth Amendment issues implicated by 
subsequent monitoring of a convicted defendant’s computer activity. 
Consequently, the Internet restriction debate centers on whether it is both 
constitutional and practical to enforce a total ban on Internet access.13 In 
those courts that do allow offenders restricted access as a condition of 
probation or supervised release, one question open to deliberation is 
whether the monitoring techniques employed by probation officers 
infringe on offenders’ expectations of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment.14 
The comment argues that current technological monitoring 
techniques used to track the computer activities of convicted child 
pornographers do not constitute a violation of Fourth Amendment search 
                                                                                                             
 8 Compare United States v. Granger, 117 F. App’x 247 (4th Cir. 2004) (upholding a 
special provision restricting defendant’s use of computers to those without Internet 
access, without allowing a probation officer’s exception), with United States v. Holm, 
326 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a total ban on Internet use as a condition of 
defendant’s supervised release was too broad and unnecessarily deprived the defendant’s 
liberty). 
 9 See cases, supra note 8. 
 10 See United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2002); see also United States v. 
Freeman, 94 F. App’x 40 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 11 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 
483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987), in turn quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 
(1972)). 
 12 See supra note 11, for cases that acknowledge the forfeiture of certain First and 
Eighth Amendment rights for parolees who have relinquished full protection by virtue of 
their parolee status after conviction. 
 13 This comment addresses the practicality of enforcing a total Internet ban in section 
II. 
 14 See infra note 49 for a discussion of this point in United States v. Lifshitz, 369 
F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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and seizure entitlements. Thus, Fourth Amendment concerns do not 
prevent a court from imposing a condition during sentencing that allows 
an offender some Internet access through monitoring software that tracks 
online activity. However, attempts to police the online activity of those 
offenders implicate public policy issues, including re-training costs 
which arise when probation officers learn how to enforce the restriction. 
These concerns render the probationary restrictions both problematic to 
employ and difficult to enforce. 
This comment evaluates the efficacy of the current probation 
punishment scheme to conclude that punishment solely by the terms of 
probation or parole violations is inadequate. In response, the comment 
proposes that circumventing government efforts to make safe a 
technology following a conviction for viewing, possessing, or 
distributing online child pornography should invoke an additional, 
independent civil and criminal offense. The comment first addresses 
probation as a form of punishment and how different courts of appeals 
historically approached a restriction on Internet access as a condition of 
supervised release in the context of the Fourth Amendment. The next 
section discusses the impracticality of imposing a total Internet ban on 
sex offenders. The third section explains current computer surveillance 
techniques the government employs to monitor offenders in jurisdictions 
that limit Internet access. The fourth section presents the problems of 
practicality that accompany enforcement of restricted Internet access in 
the probationary context. The fifth section analyzes the credibility 
problem that effectively renders a violation of probation an empty threat. 
Using the Digital Millennium Copyright Act as a model,15 the final 
section discusses the rise of criminal copyright infringement to propose a 
statutory scheme that creates criminal and civil penalties for those 
offenders who circumvent the software used to restrict Internet access as 
a condition of probation. 
II. PROBATION AS PUNISHMENT FOR INTERNET CRIMES 
A. Probation and Supervised Release Under the Sentencing Guidelines 
Conditional restrictions are authorized by statute as a form of 
punishment after conviction under a scheme of supervised release or 
probation within the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
(“Guidelines”).16 In addition to providing a calculus for actual time in 
prison, the Guidelines also inform a judge’s decision to impose a term of 
                                                                                                             
 15 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). 
 16 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006). 
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supervised release to follow any prison sentence, or allow the defendant 
to return to society for a term of probation subject to attached 
conditions.17 
Supervised release is allowed only under certain conditions outlined 
in the Guidelines.18 Unlike parole, which merely shortens the amount of 
prison time served, supervised release is a period of time following the 
full term of incarceration.19 While the length of supervision varies 
depending upon the underlying crime, section 3583 indicates that 
supervision cannot exceed five years for severe crimes.20 These 
conditions of release contain both mandatory and discretionary 
provisions, permitting a judge to order further restrictions on an offender 
who obtains supervised release.21 The Guidelines employ a balancing 
approach to ensure that a sentence imposes no greater deprivation than 
necessary to afford an offender the opportunity to rehabilitate while 
simultaneously protecting the public against recidivism by meeting penal 
goals.22 
A court imposing a discretionary condition of supervised release or 
probation must ensure that the condition is reasonably related to the 
factors set forth in section 3553, including: the nature and circumstances 
of the offense;23 the need for the sentence imposed, incorporating the 
seriousness of the offense and the interest in promoting respect for the 
law while providing just punishment;24 the deterrence of further criminal 
conduct by the defendant;25 and the protection of the public from further 
criminal conduct by the defendant.26 Furthermore, the condition must 
involve “no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary”27 
for the purposes of deterrence and protection of the public while 
remaining consistent with policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission for any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of 
                                                                                                             
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Christopher Wiest, Comment, The Netsurfing Split: Restrictions Imposed on 
Internet and Computer Usage by Those Convicted of a Crime Involving a Computer, 72 
U. CIN. L. REV. 847, 850 (2003). The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), rendered the Guidelines merely advisory instead of 
mandatory in the Federal system, permitting judges a greater degree of discretion during 
sentencing. 
 20 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) (2006). 
 21 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). 
 22 Wiest, supra note 18, at 850. 
 23 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006). 
 24 § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
 25 § 3553(a)(2)(B). 
 26 § 3553(a)(2)(C). 
 27 United States v. Heidebur, 417 F.3d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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supervised release or probation.28 Hence, courts are cognizant of 
remaining within the parameters of the Guidelines when imposing 
Internet restrictions as a condition of supervised release or probation for 
sex offenders convicted of trafficking online child pornography. 
B. Appellate Courts Differ in the Treatment of a Restriction on Internet 
Access as a Condition of Supervised Release or Probation 
The courts of appeals differ in their evaluations of district court 
decisions that employ the option of sentencing offenders to supervised 
release or probation with restrictive conditions after convictions for 
Internet crimes.29 District courts rely on an ability to impose 
discretionary special conditions in order to restrict an offender’s access 
to the Internet after a conviction for trafficking online child 
pornography.30 Appeals to such conditions historically met with different 
results, creating a split among the courts of appeals regarding the 
propriety of a denial to Internet access.31 The Ninth and Eleventh 
Circuits have upheld conditional restrictions on Internet usage for 
individuals convicted of sex crimes, while the Second and Eighth 
Circuits have reversed Internet restrictions as conditions of supervised 
release.32 Different courts of appeals historically addressed restricting 
                                                                                                             
 28 § 3553(a)(4)(B). 
 29 See supra notes 6 and 8 for examples of different appellate court rationales in the 
probationary setting. In addition, as of September 2007, the Tenth Circuit split with the 
Third and Fifth Circuits regarding a presumption of transmission across state lines when 
defendants use the Internet. Compare United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 
2007) (reversing the district court to hold that there is no presumption that an Internet 
transmission, standing alone, moves across state lines to satisfy the interstate commerce 
requirement in the federal child pornography statute [18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (2006)]), with 
United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006) and United States v. Runyan, 
290 F.3d 223 (5th Cir. 2002) (both allowing the government to satisfy the requisite 
interstate commerce nexus through direct evidence of a defendant’s Internet use). 
 30 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006). 
 31 For example, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Granger, 117 F. App’x 247 (4th 
Cir. 2004), denied a defendant the use of any computer with Internet access, while the 
Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2003), recognized the 
defendant’s liberty interest to allow him Internet access. 
 32 Compare United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 621 (9th Cir. 2003), and United 
States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1093 (11th Cir. 2003) (both upholding an Internet 
restriction), with United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2005) (reversing an 
Internet restriction), and United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(reversing an Internet restriction). In June 2007, the Third Circuit vacated conditions of 
supervised release against a defendant that imposed an absolute lifetime ban on using 
computers and computer equipment with no exception for employment or education, 
coupled with a permanent ban against possession of “sexually explicit” books, movies, or 
video games. See United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that 
the condition’s permanency was “the antithesis of a ‘narrowly tailored’ sanction” and that 
“[t]he ubiquitous presence of the [I]nternet and the all-encompassing nature of the 
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Internet access as a condition of supervised release in the context of the 
Fourth Amendment.33 
In 1999, the Third Circuit in United States v. Crandon34 was the 
first to address a restriction on Internet access. The defendant was 
convicted of receiving child pornography and challenged a condition of 
his probation that denied him access to the Internet unless he sought 
specific approval from the United States Probation Office.35 The court 
upheld the restrictive condition, considering it reasonably related to the 
caliber of the defendant’s offense and the government’s goal of 
protecting the public.36 
Two years later, in United States v. Paul, the Fifth Circuit affirmed 
a blanket prohibition against Internet access for a defendant whose 
computer contained over 1,200 images of child pornography and who 
used e-mail to advise others on how to gain access to children by 
targeting single parents.37 The court accepted a broad restriction that did 
not include a provision permitting the defendant to use the Internet with 
approval of his probation officer.38 The Fifth Circuit also rejected the 
defendant’s argument that the Internet had become an indispensable tool 
for communicating in the modern world.39 
In contrast, other appeals courts hesitate to embrace restrictions on 
Internet access. In United States v. White,40 the Tenth Circuit commented 
that the ban imposed there could be acceptable under circumstances 
                                                                                                             
information it contains . . . provides near universal access to newspapers such as the New 
York Times; the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post; to popular magazines such 
as Newsweek and Time, [to] such respected reference materials as the Encyclopedia 
Britannica and World Book Encyclopedia, and [to] much of the world’s literature.”). One 
commentator noted that when read literally, the condition would have prohibited the 
defendant from ever owning a modern mobile phone or many books including the Bible, 
medical textbooks, and modern fiction classics. See Declan McCullagh, Police Blotter: 
Court Overturns Man’s Net Ban for Life, CNET, June 6, 2007, available at 
http://www.news.com/Police-Blotter-Court-overturns-mans-Net-ban-for-life/2100-
1030_3-6188973.html. 
 33 See, e.g., United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Holm, 326 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 34 United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 35 Id. at 125. Crandon pled guilty to one count of receiving child pornography in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and was later sentenced to seventy-eight months in 
prison followed by a three-year term of supervised release. 
 36 Id. at 128. The court indicated that the restrictive condition was narrowly tailored 
and consistent with the defendant’s criminal conduct even though it jeopardized his 
employment and impacted his First Amendment freedoms, because Crandon had used the 
Internet to develop and exploit an illegal relationship with a fourteen-year-old girl. 
 37 United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 122 S. Ct. 1571 (2002). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 169–70. 
 40 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001). 
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evident in Crandon.41 However, the court remanded the special condition 
in its own case back to the district court so that it could be reworded “to 
reflect the realities of the Internet and its rapidly changing technology.”42 
The court found that the special condition was overly broad and 
potentially violated the Sentencing Guidelines by imposing a restriction 
“greater than necessary,”43 which denied the defendant’s use of “a 
computer at a library to do any research, get a weather forecast, or read a 
newspaper online.”44 
Building on a concern to tune the scope of restrictive probationary 
Internet conditions, the Second Circuit invalidated a special condition in 
2004 that required the defendant to submit to electronic monitoring of his 
computer by his probation officer in United States v. Lifshitz.45 Noting 
that such a condition may be reasonable in certain circumstances, the 
court indicated that the current monitoring scheme was overbroad as 
imposed.46 The court performed a Fourth Amendment analysis to 
conclude that the “special needs” of the probationary system47 justified 
conditioning the offender’s probation upon his agreement to submit to 
computer monitoring.48 However, the Second Circuit in Lifshitz held that 
the broad wording of the probationary condition rendered an analysis of 
infringement on the defendant’s privacy impossible, since the court 
record provided little information as to the specific system intended to 
monitor or filter the computer.49 Furthermore, the court questioned the 
efficacy of such enforcement techniques, recognizing that experienced 
computer users might circumvent the software, thus reducing the 
effectiveness of the government’s justification for implementing those 
measures.50 
In sum, the Third and Fifth Circuits split from the Second and 
Tenth Circuits within a Fourth Amendment justification scheme when 
evaluating the scope of restrictive online access imposed by the district 
                                                                                                             
 41 The White court explained that Crandon’s use of the Internet “clearly initiated and 
facilitated a pattern of criminal conduct and victimization that produced an immediate 
consequence and directly injured the victim,” and noted that Crandon could still access 
the Internet with permission from his probation officer. Id. at 1205. See supra note 34. 
 42 Id. at 1206. 
 43 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). 
 44 White, 244 F.3d at 1206. 
 45 369 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 46 Id. 
 47 The “special needs” were to rehabilitate the defendant and ensure that he did not 
harm the community further by receiving or disseminating child pornography during his 
term of probation. Id. 
 48 Id. at 190. 
 49 Id. at 193. 
 50 Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 193. 
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courts. Courts must tailor the language in each restrictive condition using 
authority from the Sentencing Guidelines to acknowledge each 
offender’s Fourth Amendment privacy concerns. 
C. The Fourth Amendment Does Not Bar Internet Restrictions for Sexual 
Offenders Sentenced to Probation 
This comment proposes that a restriction on Internet access is a 
valid option for any district court sentencing a convicted sex offender to 
probation. However, the existing circuit split illuminates two issues. 
First, courts must evaluate the degree of any imposed Internet restriction 
in the context of each defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights to ensure 
that the denial is no more than necessary. Second, the courts then must 
consider whether the subsequent monitoring techniques put into place by 
the probationary condition deny the offender any Fourth Amendment 
guarantees against unreasonable searches. 
1. Internet Restrictions as Conditions of Supervised Release Do Not 
Violate the Offender’s Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy 
Though circuit courts split their decisions about the extent of 
restricting the Internet for sex offenders who traffic in online child 
pornography, the restriction itself does not pose any threat to the 
offender’s Fourth Amendment privacy rights against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. This is permissible because courts can tailor each 
restriction to comport with privacy concerns in any given situation. The 
split among circuit courts begins with imposition of a total or partial ban 
on Internet access as a condition of probation or parole, and further 
deepens the Fourth Amendment analysis for those courts that choose the 
partial ban allowing limited Internet access. Courts that impose a blanket 
prohibition on Internet access, like the Fifth Circuit in Paul, appear to 
focus wholly on the Guidelines by rationalizing that the egregious quality 
of child pornography validates the propriety of a total ban.51 
Comparatively, courts of appeals reviewing conditions that allow partial 
Internet access through restrictive computer monitoring measures 
address an additional Fourth Amendment component when analyzing a 
probationary special condition. These courts must ensure that the scope 
of partial access comports with the privacy rights of the defendant while 
simultaneously complying with the principles that drive the Sentencing 
Guidelines.52 
                                                                                                             
 51 See United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 52 The court’s analysis in United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 191 (2d Cir. 2004) 
illustrates this task. 
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2. Under the Supreme Court’s Existing Jurisprudence, Computer 
Searches Based Wholly on Probationary Status Would Likely Not 
Violate the Fourth Amendment 
While the Supreme Court has never addressed the question of 
whether a warrantless search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
if the search were solely predicated upon the condition of probation,53 the 
Court’s jurisprudence suggests that searches based on probationary status 
alone likely do not violate the Fourth Amendment.54 
In Samson v. California, the Supreme Court relied on a prior 
decision in Griffin v. Wisconsin to assess a case involving a suspicionless 
search of an offender out on parole.55 In Griffin, the Court acknowledged 
the special role of probation officers: “[W]e deal with a situation in 
which there is an ongoing supervisory relationship—and one that is not, 
or at least not entirely, adversarial—between the object of the search and 
the decisionmaker.”56 The Samson Court incorporated that rationale and 
ultimately held that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit a police 
officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee based solely 
on parolee status, suggesting that a condition of supervised release can 
eliminate an offender’s reasonable expectation of privacy.57 The Court 
noted that parole grants offenders a privilege premised upon compliance 
with other requirements.58  
Moreover, the Samson Court cited special conditions for parolees, 
such as psychiatric treatment and mandatory abstinence from alcohol, as 
examples of a parolee’s limited expectation of privacy based on parolee 
status alone.59 Akin to probationers, the Court considered the defendant’s 
compliance with the parole option to be an equally “salient” factor, 
evidencing personal awareness and acceptance that he might be 
subjected to suspicionless searches.60 Consequently, the Court concluded 
that “imposing a reasonable suspicion requirement [before police officers 
could search parolees] would give parolees greater opportunity to 
anticipate searches and conceal criminality.”61 The Court concluded that 
concerns about an offender’s incentive to conceal contraband merited an 
                                                                                                             
 53 Knights, 534 U.S. 112, at 120. 
 54 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 
2193 (2006). 
 55 Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2199. 
 56 Griffin, 483 U.S. at 879. 
 57 Id. at 879–80. 
 58 Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2198 (citing Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. 
Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998)). 
 59 Id. at 2199. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 2201. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 120; Griffin, 483 U.S. at 879. 
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“intensive” system of supervision in Griffin v. Wisconsin, and that these 
concerns applied with even greater force to the supervision of parolees.62  
Consequently, while the Supreme Court’s existing jurisprudence 
does not explicitly address a condition of probation that restricts 
probationer or parolee access to the Internet, it sets a framework that 
allows the inference that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated in such 
instances. Incorporating the adversarial supervisory relationship of 
probation officers and offenders acknowledged in Griffin into Samson’s 
limited rights rationale implies that Fourth Amendment rights are not 
violated when courts restrict Internet access to offenders granted 
supervised release or probation. 
III. ENFORCEMENT OF A TOTAL BAN ON INTERNET ACCESS IS 
PROBLEMATIC AND IMPRACTICAL  
Despite diminished Fourth Amendment concerns, a court still faces 
the task of drafting a suitable restrictive condition for an offender living 
in a technologically-dependent society. A court considering a condition 
of probation must acknowledge the realities of the Internet age while 
effectively limiting the offender’s computer activity.63 Circuit courts 
allowing restrictive access to the Internet need to uphold the Sentencing 
Guidelines by narrowly tailoring special conditions. Conflicting circuits 
that promote a total ban on Internet access face additional problems of 
practicality when enforcing the blanket prohibition. 
Internet technology is so commonplace and convenient that curbing 
offender access seems nearly impossible.64 The ease of online 
accessibility creates a huge burden on law enforcement when both the 
public and private sectors offer Internet access so readily—nearly every 
public library and airport offers computers with Internet access, and most 
cellular phones now have online capability. Furthermore, hotel rooms, 
gyms, and educational institutions provide countless opportunities for 
crafty offenders to violate a blanket prohibition on Internet access. 
Technological change is so rapid that it is possible to contemplate easier 
means of Internet access in the future, even in areas that have yet to 
succumb to the digital network.65 A complete bar to online access also 
affects the sentencing goal of rehabilitation—probationers are expected 
                                                                                                             
 62 Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2201; Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875; see also United States v. 
Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 461 (2002). 
 63 The Tenth Circuit majority made such an acknowledgment in United States v. 
White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1207 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 64 See Where Americans Use the Internet, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0921870. 
html (last visited Sept. 15, 2007). 
 65 Some examples include automatic Internet capability wired into every new home, 
or free wireless signals on buses or subway systems and in waiting areas of hospitals. 
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to secure steady employment, but may be wary of pursuing many clerical 
jobs in contemporary society that now offer Internet access. In addition, 
employers and potential employees alike utilize online research and 
communication resources related to the job search. While not a perfect 
solution, however, blocking software may justify a partial ban to restore 
the Internet as an acceptable tool a probationer may use to obtain 
employment. 
The anonymity of the electronic interface is another factor that 
precludes effective enforcement of a total Internet ban. Although Internet 
access in the employment context is more readily regulated because 
employers can bar any probationer from using a computer or going 
online, private circumvention of the probationary condition is easily 
achieved if offenders merely borrow computers or choose different login 
names. The previous section argues that offenders cannot protest a 
complete ban on the principle that the Internet’s indispensability dictates 
them a right to read a newspaper or book travel arrangements online, 
because the “unfairness” argument implicates a quality-of-life assertion 
that probationers and parolees are no longer qualified to make. Samson 
and other Supreme Court precedent diffuse the argument that because the 
Internet is so pervasive, any denied access to it implicates Fourth 
Amendment concerns. The rationales put forth by the Supreme Court in 
Samson and Griffin indicate that probationers and parolees simply do not 
enjoy the same constitutional entitlements as regular citizenry because of 
criminal conduct.66 Sex offenders convicted for abusing the Internet 
therefore should not expect a right to use it, especially when their 
criminal conduct hinged entirely on the technology. 
On the other hand, if offenders protest that a condition against total 
Internet access is unfair and impractical this contention may be valid 
when there is a risk for violation through Internet exposure that is not 
within their control, such as at a library, airport, or gym. The ban is 
designed to prevent actual Internet activity, however, and most of these 
exposures would require further conduct on the offender’s part. Still, the 
daily infusion of Internet technology presents many potential 
opportunities for an offender to violate probation and law enforcement’s 
limited ability to enforce a ban cannot completely alleviate the risks from 
an environment rife with temptation. 
All courts that contend with sex offenders convicted of trafficking 
child pornography on the Internet seek to satisfy the Sentencing 
Guidelines by matching punishment to the nature of the crime 
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committed. The goal of those circuits that impose a blanket prohibition 
on Internet access is both noble and obvious, but fails to account for the 
impracticality of enforcing the condition. The Internet’s dominant role in 
society makes monitored restricted access a more viable option for the 
courts. Therefore, courts intent on restricting Internet access must specify 
technological measures that impose varying degrees of intrusion. 
IV. VARIOUS TECHNOLOGICAL METHODS ARE AVAILABLE TO ENFORCE 
A RESTRICTION ON INTERNET ACCESS 
A survey of current technology highlights the variety of methods 
available for probation officers to enforce conditions that permit 
offenders partial Internet access. Current technology allows for 
flexibility, but also creates opportunities for offenders to circumvent 
existing methods. Available enforcement measures include installing 
software on an individual’s personal computer and tracking records 
provided by the probationer’s Internet Service Provider (“ISP”).67 
A. Software Technology 
Software provides an advantage over ISP record-keeping in that 
software allows a probation officer or other monitor to investigate all of a 
probationer’s computer-based activities for offensive behavior that might 
occur without accessing the Internet.68 Installed software can target 
specifically-unauthorized materials, or may monitor the computer user’s 
activity in the entirety.69 The Second Circuit suggested in United States 
v. Lifshitz that “[t]hese [technological] distinctions may be material to 
determining whether the scope of the monitoring condition’s 
infringement on privacy is commensurate with the ‘special needs’ 
[analysis used to determine the validity of a condition of supervised 
release.]”70 
The Second Circuit’s invalidation of the computer restriction in 
Lifshitz reflected the court’s concern that the lack of specificity as to the 
government’s intended means of monitoring might result in a violation of 
what it held to be Lifshitz’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The court  
explained that “[c]onstant inspection . . . might be more like searching 
his diary or inspecting his closets than it is like the highly targeted 
diagnosis accomplished by [a monitoring means similar to] drug 
testing.”71 The Second Circuit then advocated a monitoring system that 
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would alert a probation officer only when the defendant engaged in 
designated impermissible communication over e-mail or the Internet.72 
The Lifshitz court emphasized that the scope of any online 
monitoring condition must align with the “special needs” of each 
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.73 The tools available to 
law enforcement allow courts to vary the scope of any condition pursuant 
to a probationary Internet restriction. Probation officers use a variety of 
software that logs a user’s recent computer activity, actively monitors 
current usage, and filters an offender’s access to Internet websites. 
1. Forensic Software 
Forensic software enables an investigator to collect and recover 
stored computer data for later analysis of a user’s cumulative past 
activity. Recent technological advancements provide investigators with 
the option of physically seizing a computer and examining its contents, 
or alternatively logging into a network that provides virtual access to a 
user’s computer system. The standard tool widely recognized by the 
industry and validated by the courts is EnCase®.74 This software is 
offered in two editions that operate by mounting stored data from the 
user’s drive into an activity log that is accessed by an investigator 
utilizing a private access key.75 
The ability of the Enterprise software to run in a live environment 
differentiates it from the Forensic edition, allowing the investigator to 
log into a network which makes a virtual connection to a target user’s 
machine that complies with the investigator’s request to snapshot volatile 
data or preview the user’s drive.76 The software encrypts the offender’s 
data and is accessible only to specifically authorized parties, to provide a 
greater security measure against tampering while establishing a chain of 
custody that is admissible in court. The Forensic edition provides the 
same evidentiary activity log, but requires a probation officer to 
physically access the probationer’s computer to retrieve the usage 
report.77 
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2. Monitoring Software 
Continual monitoring software such as SPECTOR® can 
supplement a periodic review of past computer usage. Monitoring 
software captures the user’s entire computer by recording all computer 
activity including Internet browsing and web-based e-mail services such 
as Hotmail, Yahoo mail, and AOL.78 This monitoring program takes a 
snapshot of a person’s computer use as frequently as once per second, 
holding usage information accrued over several months in a hidden 
location for later review by an outside party.79 The automatic snapshot 
function mimics a surveillance camera by providing a visual record of 
screenshots, while recording e-mail, chat conversations, and user 
keystrokes.80 The Professional edition of the software e-mails an 
immediate report to a designated recipient once the offender uses any 
inappropriate keywords delineated in advance by the subscriber.81 This 
notification report contains details of when, where, and how a keyword 
was used, including the number of times it was typed or appeared on a 
computer, on a website, or in an e-mail.82 
3. Filtering Software 
Software can filter or block information on an offender’s local 
computer or function through an ISP to block user access to 
predetermined websites as a probation officer dictates per the terms of 
probation. Proxy server programs control network traffic between local 
users and the Internet. A probation officer can designate settings that 
deny specific file requests from a local user or block inappropriate web 
pages and e-mail messages.83 For example, the Lifshitz84 opinion noted in 
dicta how an off-site ISP in Bexar County, Texas maintained an 
agreement with the local judiciary, providing probationers with Internet 
service that restricted access to sex-related sites or other areas expressly 
forbidden by conditions of parole or probation.85 The system provides an 
alternative software method by interrupting Internet data at the ISP 
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source rather than via screenshot monitoring or pre-access blocking 
methods. All technologies require a skilled probation officer to program 
or sort through the resultant data and require strategic planning to keep 
pace with resourceful offenders who may attempt to circumvent each 
technology. Thus, when tailoring release conditions, courts select from a 
technological menu with varying degrees of surveillance options 
including activity logs, screen snapshots, and interruptive filtering of 
network traffic. Courts must also consider the technological proficiency 
of each offender to reduce the potential for circumvention. 
B. Flexibility in Software Options Mitigates Potential Privacy Concerns 
in the Probationer Context 
Just as a court can customize probationary conditions to reduce 
privacy concerns when restricting Internet access, applicable methods of 
monitoring and restricting are flexible enough to allow custom tailoring 
of any probationary condition. Forensic software focuses on past 
behavior, and while physical acquisition of an offender’s computer adds 
an intrusive element, designating a method such as remote accession to 
preview a target drive permits narrow tailoring of a probationary 
condition. A probation officer’s ability to search for particularized illegal 
activity within a designated computer closely matches the Lifshitz 
guidelines, further mitigating Fourth Amendment protests from 
probationers subject to restricted Internet access. 
C. Skilled Internet Offenders Invite the Potential for Circumvention 
While the Fourth Amendment poses no great hurdle to Internet 
restrictions, an unwieldy Internet landscape complicated by the 
technological prowess of particular offenders threatens every method of 
computer surveillance with the potential for subversion. Given the ever-
changing breadth of sexually-related content available online, probation 
officers face the impractical task of staying abreast of myriad 
pornographic sites that morph and change on a daily basis in order to 
effectively program the filtering software.86 An offender might defeat 
monitoring through encryption or steganography, both of which entail 
hiding trigger messages within a larger document.87 Moreover, the 
proliferation of free proxy websites allows any computer user to hide a 
                                                                                                             
 86 ISC Internet Domain Survey, http://www.isc.org/index.pl?/ops/ds/ (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2007) (Internet Domain Name survey indicates over 500 million current online 
host sites as of January, 2007). 
 87 Jim Tanner, Rethinking Computer Management of Sex Offenders Under 
Community Supervision, 15 J. OFFENDER MONITORING 11, (Summer/Fall 2002), available 
at http://www.kbsolutions.com/rcm.pdf. 
204 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 4:187 
personal IP address and surf the Internet anonymously without revealing 
the identity of the particular computer.88 Alternatively, offenders can 
simply utilize a non-monitored computer to circumvent any condition of 
probation. Thus, the various technologies available provide flexible 
options but do not resolve the circumvention problem. These realities 
reinforce the pressing need for additional deterrents such as specific 
statutory civil and criminal penalties for any user who willfully 
circumvents monitoring or filtering technology installed as a restrictive 
condition of probation. 
V. ENFORCEMENT OF A PARTIAL BAN ON INTERNET ACCESS IS POSSIBLE 
YET ULTIMATELY PROBLEMATIC 
While Fourth Amendment concerns are reduced for those subjected 
to partial Internet bans because the judiciary can adjust probationary 
conditions for any situational need, attempts to police the online activity 
of those offenders invoke the same practical obstacles that arise out of 
the total ban scenario. Regardless of the technological method employed, 
monitoring the Internet habits of probationers implicates public policy 
issues relating to cost, officer qualifications, and practicality, given the 
ease of Internet access in daily life and the constant volatility in content. 
There are transactional costs that will accompany any monitoring or 
filtering method employed with Internet restrictions as a condition of 
probation. For example, probation officers must be trained to effectively 
enforce the Internet restriction. Proper preparation may demand an 
entirely new skill-set of technological awareness. For those courts that do 
not restrict Internet access due to its prevalence in today’s society, the 
practicality of enforcing special probationary conditions becomes an 
issue after a sentence grants law enforcement access to an offender’s 
computer. 
A. Enforcing an Internet Restriction is Impractical Because the Internet 
is Easily Accessible 
The proliferation of Internet use within public space makes 
enforcement of a probationer’s Internet access potentially unwieldy. 
Monitoring and filtering are only useful for activities conducted on a 
designated computer. Compliance with an Internet restriction creates an 
additional challenge for probationers who may be employed in jobs that 
require the use of a computer. Further, Internet access is readily available 
from public computers at the public library or even via online access 
through cellular phones. New York City has currently contracted with an 
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Internet Service Provider to make Central Park a hotspot with free 
wireless Internet access.89 
The effects of restricting the Internet for a probationer are useless if 
the user cannot be identified when using a different computer. 
Techniques will accommodate this truth in ways that affect greater 
society. Enforcing a restriction by blocking access to specific sites at the 
public library, for example, might deny the general public fair use simply 
because of a potential for abuse by probationers and parolees.90 The 
resultant public policy would create a perversely tightened and restrictive 
Internet environment for the masses who have not voluntarily 
relinquished rights through the commission of a crime. 
B. Enforcing an Internet Restriction is Difficult Because Technology is 
Volatile 
The limitations of current technology cannot always satisfy the 
judicial scope of Internet monitoring in conditions of probation or parole, 
further reducing the efficacy of restrictive conditions. While courts may 
craft monitoring conditions of probation that satisfy the jurisprudential 
scope of an Internet restriction, actual implementation is unwieldy and 
impractical. Proponents of the Internet ban as well as its detractors agree 
that the development of forensic search technology is uncertain at best 
and subject to immediate counter-strategies devised by savvy hackers.91 
The sheer number of rapidly changing forensic programs further 
complicates the practicality of enforcing an Internet ban.92 The best tool 
for a particular situation greatly depends on its cost and ease of use, as 
well the skill of the particular officer using it.93 
C. Adequately Enforcing an Internet Restriction Often Requires 
Specialized Training for Probation Officers 
Offenders may possess computer knowledge that far surpasses that 
of their probation officers. This invites a game of “cat-and-mouse”94 to 
epitomize the potential futility of relying on technological methods to 
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adequately enforce an Internet restriction. Thus, monitoring and filtering 
the Internet for probationers and parolees by permitting such individuals 
to live outside of prison introduces a new task of balancing the price of 
enforcement against the dual goals of deterrence and rehabilitation where 
individual privacy and public safety is no longer the primary issue. By 
relaxing Fourth Amendment concerns for probationers and parolees, 
courts remove the dreaded fact-finding burden that would require them to 
cull the latest technologies in order to prescribe the least-invasive 
monitoring techniques for a probationary condition of release. Courts 
also avoid the potential for a clogged judiciary when defendants like 
Lifshitz return to court to request modifications to supervisory conditions 
in the face of cutting edge technology that would reduce an infringement 
on their Fourth Amendment rights. In order to impede an offender’s 
potential to violate the Internet restriction, conditions should clearly 
mandate that the offender use only specially-designated computer 
terminals, perhaps in conjunction with random drop-in visits and 
continual technological surveillance by probation officers. 
1. The Colorado Training Scenario 
The state of Colorado spearheaded an effort to develop an intensive 
two-day technical training program for probation officers at the Rocky 
Mountain location of the National Law Enforcement and Corrections 
Technology Center (“NLECTC-Rocky Mountain”).95 The course builds 
on the notion that there is no known cure for sexual deviancy and 
furthers the goal of containing an offender’s deviant impulses by using 
programs that help identify thinking errors, recognize risk factors in the 
environment, and develop skills to control online behavior.96 The training 
teaches officers how to frame the conditions of probation to allow the 
probation agency the right to search an offender’s computer at any 
time.97 The program coincides with a writing in which the offender 
agrees not to view pornographic materials online and concedes that he is 
responsible for any data found on the computer.98 The computer user 
signs a form that indicating that “(s)he has “no expectation of privacy 
regarding all computer use and/or information stored on his/her 
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computer.”99 This scheme employs a contract theory of law between the 
government and the probationer, the “consideration” being probation 
instead of jail or an accepted shorter jail term in exchange for conditional 
supervised release. 
The NLECTC-Rocky Mountain also provides free software for 
probation officers to detect electronic violations of probation.100 The 
software reviews an offender’s hard drive and generates reports that are 
admissible in court and can be printed or e-mailed to others.101 In 
addition, the officer learns to apply a treatment review protocol to 
manage the offender under the supervision goals established within the 
initial agreement.102 The offender is continually mapped for adaptive 
treatment in an effort to prevent the offender from misdirecting the 
supervision team over time.103 Officers participating in the program 
install monitoring software on the offender’s computer which scans and 
captures photographic images and text, generating a report before the 
officer wipes the computer as a blank slate for the next scanning 
session.104 However, while officers learn the basic capability of forensic 
software to track offender activity, they are not trained to recognize 
technical circumvention of any particular monitoring program. 
Contrary to the traditional law enforcement approach to computer 
forensics which treats a hard drive as a historical record of evidence for a 
crime that has already occurred, probation and parole officers are 
oriented to approach the offender’s computer usage with methods of 
monitoring to prevent repeated crime.105 Software runs periodic checks 
of the hard drive to determine if there has been any violation of the 
probationary condition or if a new crime has been committed.106 The 
driving principle behind this method parallels the rationale behind drug 
testing, which theorizes that while offenders may beat a particular 
instance of computer monitoring, users who continue to violate will 
eventually get caught.107 
The added cost to train and qualify probation officers to handle the 
particular demands of the sex offender Internet probationary condition 
                                                                                                             
 99 To view the complete terms of a sample agreement, see http://www.kbsolutions. 
com/intakeagr.pdf. 
 100 Gaseau, supra note 97. 
 101 Id. 
 102 KB Solutions, Structured Sex Offender Treatment Review Overview, 
http://www.kbsolutions.com/html/ssotr.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Gaseau, supra note 97. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
208 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 4:187 
signals one obvious drawback of the Colorado model. The “cat-and-
mouse” analogy animates the constant evolution of technology, where 
offenders frequently have more computer literacy than those monitoring 
them, increasing their prowess by exchanging ideas and methods to 
dodge monitoring during time spent in prison or through other 
networks.108 Additionally, while probation officers are comfortable 
understanding the personal factors from any one case that may lead to 
criminal behavior, the Internet contains many unorthodox dangers that 
complicate the risks each officer must manage. Joe Russo, program 
manager for corrections at the NLECTC-Rocky Mountain, elaborated in 
one article that “[o]fficers are used to dealing with offenders’ addictions, 
joblessness, and family relationships; now they must also deal with 
online pornography, sex chat rooms and discussion boards, and dating 
services that target vulnerable, single-mom families with the ‘right type’ 
of children in the household.”109 
2. The Cost of Training Probation Officers Inhibits the Efficacy of a 
Probationary Condition 
The NLECTC-Rocky Mountain began offering its courses without 
fees in 2004, but many interested out-of-state agencies did not have the 
travel budget necessary to send officers to the training site.110 The current 
program offers training throughout a ten-state region to key agencies and 
participants that can provide appropriate computer labs.111 As of summer 
2006, more than 440 probation officers in sixteen states received 
training.112 Although regional training consolidated part of the costs to 
prepare probation officers for their task of monitoring sex offenders in 
this instance, economic factors surrounding restrictions on Internet 
access will spur additional public policy analysis within the circuit 
courts.113 Enforcing an Internet ban as part of a probationary condition 
for a sex offender creates many difficulties in actually controlling 
offender behavior while implicating policy concerns of cost and 
efficiency. Therefore, the criminal justice system cannot rely on 
probationary conditions alone to adequately deter and punish these 
criminals. Limited bans are possible, but not practical, due to the 
volatility and availability of the Internet and the costs for training 
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probation officers to enforce judicially-imposed conditions. Additional 
statutory civil and criminal penalties are necessary to thwart offender 
circumvention problems not resolved by technological monitoring 
measures. 
VI. PUNISHMENT SOLELY BY THE TERMS OF A PROBATIONARY 
CONDITION IS NOT ADEQUATE 
Theoretical analysis and statistical data indicate that probationary 
conditions are not effective psychological deterrents for many 
criminals.114 Consequently, a new model of punishment is necessary to 
bolster the repercussions that follow a conviction for trafficking child 
pornography on the Internet. The circumvention sanctions in the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act115 provide a viable sample punishment regime 
that punishes as a separate crime any effort to circumvent detection. 
Following this model of intellectual property law, the analysis below 
offers several reasons why offender activity that circumvents the 
government’s filtering or monitoring efforts to make safe computers 
should be treated as an additional and independent civil or criminal 
offense. The consequences for probationers who circumvent monitoring 
or filtering software are not likely to include incarceration. Hence, 
probation as a sole remedy suffers from a credibility gap that would 
benefit from additional independent statutory punishments to boost its 
deterrent power. 
A. Violators of an Internet Restriction as a Condition of Probation Are 
Unlikely to Face Prison 
In general, offenders who violate imposed conditions of probation, 
or parole under supervised release suffer consequences that are equal to 
or less than the original crime committed.116 A term of probation or 
supervised release commences when the sentence begins.117 Probation 
officers have statutory authorization to petition for revocation of 
probation118 for any violation of a probationary condition that occurs at 
any time before completion of the probationary term.119 Depending on 
the nature of the violation, the Sentencing Guidelines permit the 
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sentencing court to revoke probation and impose a prison sentence120 or 
to continue probation with the option to extend its term or modify the 
conditions of release.121 
When determining a punishment for revocation under the 
Guidelines, a sentencing court must determine the grade of the violation 
under section 7B1.1.122 A judge has discretion to choose the more serious 
punishment for the crime under either federal or state punishment 
regimes.123 Further, courts must grade the violation by taking into 
account any recidivist provisions a defendant may face if the court 
charges him with a particular offense.124 The Sentencing Commission 
also resolved a circuit split to clarify that where a defendant is sentenced 
for a new offense after revocation of parole or probation, the district 
court should impose the new sentence to run consecutively with the 
revocation sentence. 125 
Courts have some discretion to revoke or revise a defendant’s term 
of probation within the bounds of the Sentencing Guidelines;126 however, 
Congress created a basis for mandatory revocation only for offenders 
who possess firearms, refuse to submit to drug testing, and, most 
recently, for those who return multiple positive results on drug tests.127 
Accordingly, offenders convicted of child pornography do not face 
mandatory prison time for the violation of any condition of probation. 
B. Probation’s Punishment Reputation Suffers from a Credibility Crisis 
Current punishment schemes wield threats of increased probation or 
incarceration if offenders violate conditions of probation, but the 
criminal justice system suffers from a credibility crisis that feeds 
probationer recidivism.128 According to the Center for Civic Innovation 
at the Manhattan Institute, the criminal justice system’s reputation suffers 
from a lack of legitimacy as perceived by both the general community 
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and the offender.129 The American population channels its fear and 
morality into punishment as the centerpiece of policy for crime 
control.130 Our societal view is that while punishment and incarceration 
controls crime, the system should gauge the relativity of threats to public 
safety and wager accountability for lower-level non-violent offenders via 
probationary supervision.131 However, frequent instances of probation 
violations without sufficient consequence have devalued the public’s 
opinion of probation over the decades.132 In effect, both society and 
criminals do not credit the probation system as an effective means of 
offender deterrence for crime control. 
Sheer case volume contributes to the credibility problem—
probation officers are overloaded with hundreds of cases to manage, each 
requiring a varying degree of supervisory control.133 Many probation 
departments are under-funded and woefully understaffed with very little 
interagency cooperation.134 These logistical impairments result in a 
certain measure of passivity in case management. Traditional supervision 
fails to adequately supervise or hold violators accountable, which allows 
many probationers to avoid meaningful consequences if they violate 
probationary conditions.135 
Consequently, many offenders have officially “absconded” by 
failing to maintain contact with their probation officers, and the system 
exerts little effort to track absconders or otherwise bring them to 
justice.136 For those criminals who agree to follow probationary 
conditions that attempt to control behavior, there is little public 
confidence that those offenders will truly be held accountable should 
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they fail to live up to the prescribed demands.137 Our system of probation 
must redefine its image so that probation officers have sufficient 
credibility to impart a viable threat of punishment as a consequence of 
violating probationary conditions.138 Until that point, violators are free to 
revel in blame, denial of wrongdoing, refusal to accept responsibility, 
and failure to acknowledge the impact of their behavior on others.139 
C. Non-Violent Computer Criminals Arguably Perceive Probation’s 
Weaknesses 
Though statistics on probationer recidivism focus mostly on violent 
criminals,140 the punishment scheme’s credibility crisis extends to non-
violent offenders who commit computer crimes.141 Currently, the 
judiciary tends to impose probation with some form of Internet 
restriction on child pornographers who trafficked in a low number of 
offensive images.142 If this “mild” offender violates a monitoring 
condition by accessing pornography that is detectable, for example, by a 
screen capture or by disabling a keystroke monitor, the legal 
repercussion will likely contain a reprimand and an extension of the term 
of probation with a tightened monitoring regime. The offender is apt to 
believe that courts do not want to burden an already overcrowded prison 
population with a low-level offender, so the violator may capitalize on 
this vulnerability to exploit it. Thus, the punitive deterrent effect of 
computer monitoring is arguably lost on low-level offenders.143 
Further, a facetious attitude toward probationary conditions of this 
sort potentially infects every incarnation of low-level offender. A 
technologically illiterate offender familiar with the realities of the 
criminal justice system might still comprehend that the system is too 
burdened to imprison him, and so he may consider the possibility of 
actual punishment for circumventing any computer monitoring an empty 
threat. Comparatively, an offender who possesses highly sophisticated 
technical computer knowledge may circumvent monitoring methods 
based on an arrogance presumption that he can evade detection by 
                                                                                                             
 137 Id. (referring to results from unspecified public opinion polls). 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 See supra note 136. 
 141 See infra note 144. 
 142 Compare, e.g., United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999) (permitting 
limited Internet access for a defendant convicted of trafficking forty-eight sexually-
explicit photographs of a minor), with United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(denying the defendant access to the Internet, where his computer contained over 1,200 
images of child pornography). 
 143 Transforming Probation, Civic Report, supra note 128. 
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employing his own software wizardry past his probation officer’s 
sporadic and ineffectual enforcement techniques. Even if this educated 
offender humbly acknowledges some measure of efficacy from forensic 
monitoring techniques, he still may share the simpleton’s attitude that 
likelihood of actual punishment is minimal should he choose to access 
child pornography through the Internet. 
D. Alternative Forms of Punishment Are Not Suitable Options for the 
Non-Violent Computer Criminal 
Another judicial remedy is clearly necessary if the punitive threat 
for violating probation does not intimidate computer criminals into 
compliance with governmentally-imposed anti-circumvention methods. 
Because the public seeks more punishment and accountability for 
offenders, but does not necessarily agree that putting non-violent 
probation violators in prison is a solution, there remains a paradox of 
public opinion.144 Scholars have proposed experimentation with 
alternative forms of punishment as substitutes for incarceration to 
broaden the criminal justice system beyond its traditional penitentiary 
scheme.145 Examples of alternative punishments include sentencing an 
airport handler convicted of theft to clean out the horse stalls at police 
stables,146 and broadcasting photographs of people arrested for 
prostitution offenses on local television.147 These measures exemplify the 
alternative punishment notion of “shaming,” whereby the offender is 
forced to “go public” to endure some form of humiliation that imposes 
accountability for the offensive conduct. The hope is that “shaming 
sentences, especially those sentences requiring an apology or confession, 
may fulfill the basic principles of restitution.”148 
                                                                                                             
 144 Id. “[T]he seeming paradox of public opinion.” (citing J. Doble, Restorative 
Justice and Community-Based Reparative Boards: The View of the People of Vermont, 
Doble Research Associates, Feb. 1999) (explaining that “[o]n the one hand, the public 
apparently wants more punishment. On the other hand, the citizenry does not want non-
violent offenders in prison, and they favor, sometimes strongly, the use of alternatives to 
incarceration.”). 
 145 Development in Law: Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1863, 1875 
(1998) (“Experimentation with alternative punishments must occur now, not only 
because crimes and criminals are diverse and may require differing treatments, but also 
because the current demographics of the prison system simply cannot be sustained in the 
long run.”). 
 146 Development in Law: Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1967, 1981 
(1998). 
 147 See Development in Law: Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 145, at 1872 
(referring to “John TV” in Kansas City, Missouri where a local government channel 
broadcasted the photographs and biographical information of persons arrested for 
offenses related to prostitution). 
 148 See Development in Law: Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 146, at 1973. 
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Many opponents of “shaming” criticize its ability to reform 
criminal behavior149 and question its functionality; because “degrees of 
shame are difficult to quantify,”150 there is no guarantee that the offender 
experiences true accountability after enduring the alternative punishment. 
Employing a “shaming” scheme as punishment for circumvention of 
governmentally-imposed computer monitoring invokes these problems. 
The restitution principle driving the ideology does not square with a non-
violent offense such as software circumvention because there is no 
tangible “victim” that can benefit from an apology or a confession. One 
who disables a keystroke monitor to access child pornography commits a 
wrong to the justice system as a whole by failing to uphold his 
probationary agreement. However, it is difficult to craft an effective 
alternative through “shaming” which focuses on the “victim,” short of 
ordering the offender to mop up the local courthouse floors. 
Moreover, an offender convicted of possessing child pornography 
has already suffered the consequence of public humiliation from that 
crime during his original conviction. Notice to others of his continued 
indulgence in the egregious behavior via an alternative “shaming” 
punishment will not likely faze him to the degree necessary to truly 
punish or prevent future circumvention activity. In fact, the focus on the 
offender as a pariah is notably diluted after conviction if he circumvents 
monitoring software, because the humanistic dimension driving society’s 
emotional response to the reprehensible content of the original offense is 
replaced with a concentration on the illegal technological intricacies 
involved in the circumvention crime. 
Finally, there is no evidence that the threat of public “shaming” 
would provide any level of reform or serve as a deterrent to make 
offenders reconsider a potential act of circumvention.151 Not only does 
the anonymity of the Internet work to conceal the identity of the user, but 
it also obscures the identities of the victims. Those who traffic in child 
pornography are unlikely to actually know or encounter the children in 
the images they share. Without a personal connection or stake in the 
activity, these offenders will not feel any sting of punishment that seeks 
to take advantage of conscience or reputation. 
                                                                                                             
 149 Id. at 1972. 
 150 Id. at 1971. 
 151 Shaming is most effective when accompanied by restitution to a victim. See 
Development in Law: Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 146, at 1973. But there is 
arguably no cognizable victim in the context of restricted Internet access for non-violent 
computer criminals, thus reinforcing the idea that shaming is not an appropriate 
punishment for this type of probationary violation. See supra note 146. 
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Even if “shaming” were a suitable option for non-violent offenders 
who violate conditions of probation, those who support alternative 
punishments comment that federal courts face particular barriers and 
constraints in employing the measures.152 These commentators explain 
that judges are often bound by the system: “[t]he combination of the 
[Federal Sentencing] Guidelines and the statutorily mandated minimum 
sentences for many federal crimes does not regularly leave judges the 
option to experiment with various terms of probation.”153 The Guidelines 
create four “zones” that determine the baseline range for any sentence, 
combining an offender’s past criminal history with the offense level of 
the crime committed, as determined by statute, affording judges little 
discretion to impose alternative punishments beyond first-time non-
violent offenses.154 Furthermore, over one hundred federal laws require 
mandatory minimum sentences that trump the sentencing ranges in the 
Guidelines.155 Thus, judges cannot rely on their discretionary powers 
alone to craft effective deterrent measures within conditions of probation. 
Clearly, alternative punishments designed around “shaming” are 
inadequate to prevent and punish circumvention of software technology. 
“Shaming” has been criticized for its inability to reform and its 
constrained use under the Guidelines. Without an alternative punishment 
scheme, current consequences provide little deterrence to probation 
violators because they are unlikely to face prison sentences, reinforcing a 
credibility gap which extends to non-violent offenders such as computer 
criminals. A new statute that criminalizes software circumvention and 
establishes additional civil penalties will fortify the consequences of 
violating a probationary condition that restricts Internet access after a 
conviction for trafficking online child pornography. 
VII. CREATION OF SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT CRIMINAL AND CIVIL 
OFFENSES IS THE PROPER PUNISHMENT SOLUTION  
The creation of separate and independent criminal and civil 
offenses is an effective solution to deter circumvention of probationary 
restrictions for computer crimes. Statistics are clear that monitoring 
computer activity alone will not suffice to deter circumvention efforts 
that overcome restricted Internet access.156 According to Department of 
Justice figures, the Federal Bureau of Investigation failed to shut down a 
proliferation of child pornography websites or web hosts in Fiscal Year 
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2006, instead dismantling less than half of its 2,300 target goal.157 Recent 
child predator activity on social networking sites such as MySpace 
demonstrates how Internet content providers arm offenders with more 
opportunity to pursue illegal sexual activity than ever before.158 The 
expanding costs of re-training probation officers to comply with 
conditions of supervised release that involve Internet monitoring further 
the need to supplement such measures with enhanced statutory penalties 
for software circumvention. 
While the Sentencing Reform Act clearly prohibits a defendant 
from committing an additional federal, state, or local crime,159 judicial 
interpretation holds that a probation officer’s petition for revocation of 
supervised release must specify a clear statutory provision for the alleged 
violation.160 The lack of existing statutory penalties for circumventing 
computer technology undermines the purpose of a restrictive 
probationary condition, since probation officers cannot utilize the 
violation as leverage to control the offender’s computer habits. The 
typical penalty for a clear violation of a statute is often a return to prison 
to serve out the remainder of a sentence.161 Consequently, the creation of 
statutory criminal and civil penalties that target circumvention of 
computer monitoring technology would significantly bolster the deterrent 
power of probation by arming it with an effective threat of strict liability 
incarceration. 
Moreover, child pornography is a toxic issue for juries; it results in 
unsettling litigation that often involves graphic visual evidence. Any 
measure that reduces jury exposure to explicit evidence would benefit all 
participants in the judicial system.162 Prosecutors and defendants alike 
                                                                                                             
 157 Only 906 child pornography websites were shut down in Fiscal Year 2006, 
according to the United States Department of Justice. See FY 2006 Performance and 
Accountability Report, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2006/P1/p10.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2007). 
 158 See, e.g., Matt Richtel, MySpace.com Moves to Keep Sex Offenders Off of Its Site, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2006, at C3 (indicating that MySpace.com is “developing 
technologies that would help combat the use of its site by sexual predators by cross-
referencing its more than 130 million users against state databases of registered sex 
offenders.”). 
 159 See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(1), (3), (6), (7) (2006). 
 160 See United States v. Chatelain, 360 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Havier, 155 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 161 Department of Justice statistics demonstrate that only 23% of prisoners 
incarcerated for probation or parole violations were sent to prison for technical violations. 
The remaining 77% were incarcerated for committing new crimes while under 
community supervision. See the Office of Justice Programs statistics, available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/ppvsp91.txt (last visited Sept. 23, 2007). 
 162 Mock jurors were more likely to feel emotional distress and reported physical 
reactions in response to viewing graphic photographs. See Kevin S. Douglas, David R. 
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could rely on the assurance from a bright line strict liability regime that 
informs a defendant—at his original sentencing stage—of the additional 
consequences that would follow any attempt to circumvent the 
monitoring technology imposed at sentencing. The gravity of computer 
crimes involving child pornography sharpens the government’s policy 
interest in punishing child predators, justifying the fortification of 
probationary conditions through independent statutory penalties against 
circumvention of software monitoring technologies. 
A. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act is an Appropriate Model for a 
New Statutory Scheme 
This comment suggests that the appropriate statutory model for a 
software circumvention punishment scheme is the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DMCA”), which created a new category of copyright 
law in 1998 criminalizing any producer or distributor of technology that 
functions to circumvent protected access to copyrighted works.163 The 
statute carves out exceptions for lawful investigations and intelligence 
activities by authorized government officials.164 Applying the same 
principle to probationary restrictions on Internet access, any 
circumvention of surveillance techniques for the law enforcement 
purpose of enforcing the condition could become an independent cause 
of action that incurs its own parallel penalties. 
1. The Rise of Criminal Copyright Infringement 
Traditional copyright law treated infringement as a minor criminal 
wrong, envisioning a one-year imprisonment term for misdemeanor 
offenses such as unlawful dramatic and musical performances.165 
However, amendments to the 1909 Copyright Act in 1976 and again in 
1982 revamped the criminal provisions to create a felony-class offense 
for certain types of first-time willful infringing uses.166 Congress 
responded to the growth of the Internet and the ease of online 
infringement in 1997 with its passage of the No Electronic Theft Act, 
widening the scope of felony criminal copyright infringement to include 
                                                                                                             
Lyon & James R. P. Ogloff, The Impact of Graphic Photographic Evidence on Mock 
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485, 485 (1997). 
 163 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). 
 164 § 1201(e). 
 165 Laura Gasaway, Criminal Copyright Infringement, INFORMATION OUTLOOK, April 
2004, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0FWE/is_4_8/ai_n6108144. 
 166 Id. (noting that the 1982 amendment classified certain activities as felonies 
depending on the number of infringing copies made or sold with a 180-day period, and 
increased penalties up to five years in prison and $250,000 in fines). 
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a maximum prison term of one-year imprisonment for first-time 
infringers that were not seeking commercial gain.167 The criminal 
treatment of purposeful infringement of copyrighted material for 
personal as well as commercial use was enhanced in 1998, when 
Congress enacted the DMCA to provide criminal penalties for activities 
that lead to infringement.168 
The act of circumventing technological protection is defined within 
the DMCA as “avoiding, bypassing, removing, deactivating, or otherwise 
impairing a technological measure.”169 The DMCA refers to technology 
such as video cassette recorders and computer software.170 The statute 
controls access to copyrighted works to prevent infringement, penalizing 
manufacturers of circumvention technology as well as users, to maximize 
the threat of infringement liability.171 Section 1203 provides for civil 
remedies that include actual damages as well as any additional profits 
earned by the violator.172 Provisions allow a complaining party to elect 
statutory damages for each circumvention violation in a range of $200 
through $2,500 “per act of circumvention, device, product, component, 
offer, or performance of service, as the court considers just.”173 Financial 
statutory penalties increase within a range of $2,500 through $25,000 for 
attempts that induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal copyright 
infringement.174 The current act builds in seven limited exemptions that 
allow circumvention of access and copy controls for certain activities 
such as educational and research tasks.175 The entirety of section 1201 in 
the DMCA is known as the anti-circumvention provision. As of May 
2007, the Department of Justice introduced a bill that will potentially 
permit a judge to award damages for each separate piece of a copyrighted 
work rather than applying the infringement analysis to an entire work or 
compilation.176 Consequently, law enforcement officials appear poised to 
expand these provisions. 
                                                                                                             
 167 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000), which indicates that a commercially 
motivated infringer may receive a federal prison term of five years and $250,000 in fines, 
whereas a non-commercial infringer is subject to a one-year prison term and $100,000 in 
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 169 § 1201(b)(2)(A). 
 170 See § 1201(k), 1201(b)(1). 
 171 See § 1201(b)(1). 
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2. Criminal Sanctions Are Ideal for Violations of Probationary 
Conditions Based on Restricted Internet Access 
The expanded criminal statutory scheme within the DMCA has 
endured a share of criticism for its danger of chilling creative 
development of new ideas or products at the expense of forming a social 
norm against conduct that is not currently viewed as immoral.177 In 
practice, initial criticism waged against the DMCA’s anti-circumvention 
provision considered it bad public policy, due to its weak enforcement 
record178 and ineffectual application to overseas activity.179 Criminal law 
necessarily evolves to respond to changes in technology and society, 
based on concepts of preventing harm to the community and condemning 
behavior generally regarded as immoral.180 Criminalization in the 
copyright infringement context is not an effective deterrent because 
scores of people continue to copy while the evolving legal standard 
selects only a small handful of violators in an unsuccessful attempt to 
build a shared moral code against infringing activity.181 Further, a 
deterrence effort through criminalization is most understandably justified 
when there is a cognizable harm to the protected person, but when people 
only infringe for personal use, linking a causal harm to infringement is 
speculative at best because other factors may account for sales declines, 
since personal use does not impact market share.182 
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 182 Id. at 753–55. 
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In contrast, the traditional criminal punishment setting is wholly 
appropriate for independent statutory civil and criminal penalties that 
condemn software circumvention efforts. Forming social norms through 
criminal laws is most compelling when it is based on an existing moral 
code.183 Unlike the copyright setting, using criminal sanctions to forge a 
new community norm is unnecessary in the probationary context, 
because crime and conviction are openly acknowledged responses to 
violations of established societal norms; the additional sanctions serve as 
a complementary deterrent measure to promote understood societal 
expectations. In addition, the harm to the community can already be 
characterized as a general threat to public safety and stability when the 
new (probationary) violation is connected to conduct from a prior 
criminal conviction, regardless of the nature of the violation itself. The 
harm falls within the conventional notions of punishment when the 
perpetrator is an already- convicted offender with clear notice of the 
conditions he must adhere to within the parameters of the initial 
probationary sentence. 
3. The Application of the DMCA Model is Appropriate for a New 
Statutory Scheme Aimed at Offenders Who Circumvent Forensic 
Monitoring Techniques 
Applying the underlying principles and statutory scheme from the 
DMCA, punishment for circumventing forensic monitoring software 
should be a separate and independent violation of a probationary term. 
Computers, like the technologies addressed by the DMCA, serve a dual-
use function. They are unique tools for research and structuring 
information, but also carry the potential to perform criminal acts. 
Congress has the constitutional grant of power to enact a strict liability 
regime that addresses particular software circumvention techniques by 
sex offenders whose restricted access to the Internet derives from Federal 
Sentencing conditions of probation.184 The government has a compelling 
interest in preventing crime. It can sidestep any opponents who question 
congressional regulation of the Internet by arguing that the punitive 
scheme is not an attempt to control Internet content in general—a proper 
rebuttal would indicated that the statutory scheme encompasses a 
narrowly-tailored effort that is deeply-rooted in the sentencing and 
punishment of specific online sexual offender conduct in particular.185 
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 184 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18. 
 185 Some policy analysts, such as the Cato Institute, fear a chilling effect from any 
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 In enacting additional penalties for circumvention activity, for 
example, Congress could copy the civil remedy structure from the 
DMCA to impose financial obligations on an offender who disables a 
keystroke detector. Penalties might be levied depending upon the degree 
of circumvention; for example, one possibility enabling access to child 
pornography is through a proxy server that bypasses all filtering 
measures, so the court could impose the highest possible fine or 
incarceration period for this high-level offense. While courts have 
struggled to draft and tailor monitoring conditions, a statute with strict 
liability language would enable courts to impose clear guidelines and 
penalties across the board for all types and levels of circumvention (for 
example, the statute may establish one definition of “circumvention” to 
include using more than one designated computer at the offender’s 
home.) Other definitions of “circumvention” could expand its scope to 
address particular instances of software circumvention ostensibly 
committed by the savviest offenders, with delineated bright line civil 
penalties and mandatory incarceration determined by the nature of the 
technique the offender used to circumvent the software. 
The strict liability attribute of statutory circumvention penalties also 
provides distinct notice to offenders about the consequences of 
circumvention, injecting a fortified threat to provide additional 
deterrence where the gaps in credibility for probationary violations and 
options of alternative punishments currently fall short. Thus, the DMCA 
is an excellent model to resolve the software circumvention problem by 
providing additional civil and criminal sanctions aimed at offenders who 
circumvent technology imposed as a condition of probation. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The circuit courts of appeals divide when considering the scope of 
restrictive conditions surrounding Internet access for sex offenders 
sentenced to probation or supervised release after a conviction for online 
trafficking of child pornography. The Second and Eighth Circuits have 
reversed Internet restrictions on the ground that such conditions were 
overbroad in the context of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. In 
contrast, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits acknowledged that careful 
tailoring of the language in the condition and careful selection of the 
enforcement technology can combine to render restrictive Internet 
conditions an entirely appropriate punishment. 
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Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that status as a probationer 
or parolee reduces that person’s Fourth Amendment rights, permitting 
the inference that a partial or total ban on Internet access does not 
infringe on the privacy rights of convicted sex offenders. However, 
enforcing such restrictive conditions on Internet access is impractical and 
burdensome, due to the impracticalities of curbing offender exposure to 
the Internet in modern society. Further, there are prohibitive costs when 
training officers to track the offenders’ computer activities using forensic 
software, filtering, and monitoring technology. 
The credibility crisis in the probationary punishment scheme 
weakens the current deterrent value of restrictive conditions against sex 
offenders subjected to forensic monitoring or filtering of their Internet 
activities. Moreover, statistics highlight the failure of punishment for 
probationary violations as a viable threat against non-violent offenders. 
In addition, an alternative punishment scheme is not appropriate for 
probationers convicted of trafficking online child pornography because 
its capacity to “shame” the defendant is likely to be diluted and 
ineffective. 
Courts often employ legal balancing tests that weigh the totality of 
circumstances in each particular lawsuit,186 but bright line rules offer a 
certainty of consequence that benefits all participants in the justice 
system. Clearly, punishment solely by the terms of probation is not 
adequate. Enacting additional and independent criminal and civil 
offenses premised on strict liability for any probationer activity that 
circumvents the government’s efforts to make safe dual-use technologies 
following a conviction for viewing, possessing, or distributing online 
child pornography will clarify litigation and give notice to defendants 
that restrictions on Internet use are serious measures that warrant 
compliance. The deterrent value in such a solution will ensure that the 
criminal justice system regains the respect of the public and offender 
alike, to prevent any further exploitation of children. 
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